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Abstract. The study examines egalitarianism policies in terms of the relationship between 
labor and capital and extends the model developed by the economist Bowles. We introduce 
the demand factor to the Bowles model (2012), which discussed the effectiveness of the 
income and asset redistribution policies in a global economy. The improvement of 
productivity and the decrease in the ratio of monitoring labor through asset-based 
redistribution increase the real wage rate because of its lure for foreign capital. At this point 
in the Bowles model, the labor supply increases and then employment increases. In 
contrast, in our model, with the addition of the demand factor, the improvement of 
productivity increases employment, but the decrease in monitoring labor does not always 
increase employment as both demand and supply increase. This means that asset-based 
redistribution in a global economy is not always effective. 
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1. Introduction 
egative aspects of globalization are receiving a significant amount of 
attention.One of these is the fear that egalitarianism policies may not be 
compatible with globalization.Income redistribution may decrease 
international competitiveness, and asset redistribution may cause capital 
flights.Examining the effectiveness of egalitarianism policies is an urgent task as it 
truly indicates that many people worldwide read the French economist Picketty 
(2013), who sounds the alarm on the expansion of inequality.Here we examine 
egalitarianism policies in terms of the relationship between labor and capital. 
Bowles (2012) argues that income redistribution is difficult under globalization 
and demonstrated the effectiveness of asset redistribution. 
In his book, the ``sharking'' model was constructed in which workers determine 
labor efficiency considering labor institutions, unemployment compensation, and 
monitoring by firms with rapid capital movement across borders. It concludes that 
strengthening firing regulations and expanding unemployment compensation 
decrease employment due to increase in wages; however, the redistribution of 
assets increases employment because it improves labor productivity by improving 
labor incentives.Furthermore, it assures the existence on multiple equilibriums due 
to endogenous risk premiums, and examines the increase in productivity based on 
public spending.  
 
a† Nagoya Gakuin University, Faculty of Economics, Nagoya City, Aichi 456-0036, Japan. 
 +81 052 678 4081 
 taro-abe@ngu.ac.jp 
N 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 2(3), T. Abe, p.374-382. 
375 
375 
Bowles shows effectiveness of the redistribution of assets, contrasting this with 
the difficulty in the redistribution of income under globalization. 
However, he excludes aspects of effective demand.The significance of 
emphasizing aspects of supply side economics, following the thinking of Bowles 
and Boyer (1995), empirically indicates the difficulty of the redistribution of 
income under globalization.Additionally, Lavoie and Stockhammer (2012) show 
that the changes a wage-led economy brings about depend on conditions in each 
country and in each era.We can also look at the strategy of international 
cooperation to achieve wage-led economies.The fact that the increase in wages 
assumes the redistribution of income because the consumption propensity for 
wages is larger than that for capital profits is noteworthy.  
Some theoretical research exists that examines the possibility of wage-led 
economic growth. 
Blecker (1989) built a one-country macro model constrained by effective 
demand and pointed to the difficulty in wage-led growth under international 
competition.He states that an increase in wages creates a declines in international 
competitiveness due to an increase in prices and worsens the trade balance. 
Nakatani (2008) introduced capital accumulation into Blecker's research (1989) 
to examine a longer effect.He showed that an increase in wages eventually 
increases domestic production over the long run.His reasoning is that the decrease 
in the capital accumulation rate improves the trade balance due to a relative 
increase in exports.  
Blecker (1998) builds two country models in which the change of income 
distribution in one country affects the other country and goes on to examine how 
the change in relative wages affects both countries.Nakatani (2012) considers the 
combination of the growth regimes of two countries based on Blecker.The increase 
in wage facilitates growth in the foreign country and it supports the home country 
when the regime in the home country is wage-led and the regime in the foreign 
country is profit-led. In such a case, the growth rates in both countries increase.The 
production is somewhat larger in the country that increases wages; although the 
effect on growth rates is vague when the regimes in both countries are wage-led.In 
contrast, the production is rather smaller in the country that increases wages when 
the regimes in both countries are profit-led. 
Such theoretical research indicates the importance of considering the effective 
demand in redistribution policy under globalization.We will examine whether the 
arguments of Bowles (2012) still hold when we consider effective demand.This 
examination will also address the limitations in the existing research on income 
distribution policy that have not yet focused on supply side. 
The research from Bowles (2013) introduces the effective demand factors 
unlike Bowles model (2012).Bowles considers three factors-class conflict, effective 
demand, and competition as determinants of employment and wages, although his 
model is designed as a closed system.In the model, competition corresponds to 
rapid capital movement.Therefore, we can introduce effective demand factors to 
the Bowles model in the following way.  
We assume the following economy.Goods produced by labor and capital are 
either for investment or consumption.Workers are homogeneous and immobile 
across borders.Employers monitor workers and threaten to fire them in order to 
extract greater effort.In contrast, capital moves freely on a global scale, reacting to 
the after-tax profit rates.The interest rate and time preferences are constant on a 
global scale, each country acts as a small country.Workers consume all of the wage 
and unemployment compensation they receive.Capital retains some of profit 
income.Political pressure to increase the unemployment compensation rises when 
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the unemployment rate is high, and vice versa.This view is also introduced in 
Bowles (2013). 
From here forward, this study comprises the following sections.Section 2 
explains the Bowles (2012) model and section 3 introduces effective demand 
factors into the basic model.Section 4 conducts comparative statistics analysis, 
followed by our conclusion. 
  
2. Bowles Model (2012) 
We explain the Bowles model (2012) as the basic model here. We denote labor 
time h, effort per labor time by workers e, production per effort y, and the 
proportion of monitoring workers m.Thus, gross production Q is as follows: 
 
Q=yeh(1-m)                                                   (1) 
 
We standardize labor time $h$ to $0<h<1$, and assume that workers can choose 
0 or 1 in unit effort. 
Firms monitor workers and determine wage levels to equalize the pay-offs of 
those working and those shirking.Thus, the following equation holds. 
  
    (   )   (   )                                     (2) 
 
where w, a,  , and b are wage, disutility of labor, probability of firing, and 
unemployment compensation, respectively.The left hand is the pay-off of those 
working and the right hand is the pay-off of those shirking.The first term on the 
right hand indicates the case of continuation on contract, the second term signifies 
the case of firing and getting a new job, and the third term shows the case firing 
and unemployment. 




 (   )
                                                    (3) 
 
This wage level is the minimum to prevent workers from shirking.A firm's 
profit and worker's utility is optimal at this wage.In equation (3), wagew is the 
increasing function of the disutility of labor a, employment h, andunemployment 
compensation b.Equation (3) represents the equilibrium condition of labor 
supply.We can depict the labor supply function from (3).  
The profit rate is 
 
   
    
 
   
 
                    (4) 
 
where k is the required capital per labor time. 
k as intermediate goods is removed in (4) because the production goods have 
characteristics of both investment and consumption.Workers who engage in 
monitoring also get wages. 
After-tax profit rate is 
 
   (   )  
(   )(    
 
   
)
 
                           (5) 
 
wheret is tax on capital. 
Expected after-tax profit rate is 
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where d is the probability of confiscation.This probability is different in 
different countries and depends on the macroeconomic policies and political 
environments in each country. 
We assume the security asset interest rate is ρ.Zero profit condition is 
 
 ( )                                                          (7) 
 
\begin{equation} 
In this model, capital can rapidly move across borders.  
When we assume 
 
   
, we get from (5)-(7) 
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)                                   (8) 
 
Equation (8) is the equilibrium condition for labor demand.We can depict a 
labor demand curve from this equation. 
Therefore, we can summarize this model in two equations, (3) and (8) and two 
endogenous variables, w and h. 
The results of the comparative statistics are demonstrated in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1. The Result of Comparative Statistics 
  H w 
t - - 
m - - 
y + + 
k - - 
ρ - - 
μ - - 
a - 0 
τ + 0 
b - 0 
 
The distinctive results are that protection policies for workers, such as 
strengthening firing regulations ( τ ↓ ) and improving unemployment 
compensation (b↑), decrease labor supply and employment as shown in Graph 1. 
Therefore, relaxing firing regulations (τ↑), decreasing the rate of monitoring 
labor, and strengthening labor discipline should improve wages and employment. 
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GRAPH 1. Determination of Wages and Employment 
 
An improvement in productivity from trade union encouragement and 
realization of fair wages, a decrease in the disutility of labor, and an increase in the 
elasticity of labor supply on wages also improve wages and employment. 
In summary, asset based redistribution improves labor, and subsequently, the 
ratio of labor for monitoring and the increase in productivity improve employment. 
As mentioned above, the analysis excludes the effective demand.We will 
address this in the next section. 
 
3. Conclusions and the way forward  
The following model includes effective demand. 
First, we model a goods market.The equilibrium equation in the goods market is 
 
(   )(   )                                             (9) 
 
wherei, c, and g are investment, consumption, and government spending, 
respectively. 
We assume that the investment depends on the after-tax profit following Bowles 
(1988).
i
The investment function is 
 
         (   )(   )          >0,     >0                               (10) 
 
where   ,   , and k(1-m)h are animal spirits, the sensitivity of theinvestment on 
the profit, and the value of capital, respectively. 
We assume that workers consume all their wages, and some profit income    is 
saved.Thus, the consumption function is 
 
  [  (    ) (   ) (   )]                  (11) 
 
We assume that the government spends all the unemployment compensation. 
Thus, we get 
   (   )                                                            (12) 
 
We assume that an excess supply in the goods market increases unemployment 
compensation, and vice versa.Workers politically call for more hospitable 
unemployment benefits in a recession, and vice versa. 
In Japan, after the “Lehman Shock,” the anti-poverty campaigns increased and 
the acknowledgment of the unemployment compensation and social welfare was 
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The distinction of this model is that the unemployment compensation b 
is endogenous.Thus, the dynamic equation on employment is 
 
  ̇   [(   )(   )  (     )]                                     (13) 
 
In summary, this model is complete with seven equations, (3)(4)(8)(10)-(13) 
and seven endogenous variables w, h, i, c, g, r, and b.
iii
 
Variables are determined as follows.First, we assume that h is a value in 
(13).Thus, b is determined in (3) because w is determined in (8).The variable r is 
also determined in (4).Therefore, i, c, and g are determined from (10)-(12), 
respectively.Finally, h is from (13). 
Next, we conduct the comparative statistics analysis. 
We assume  ̇   $ in (13), and then substitute (3)(4)(8)(10)-(12) for it.We getiv 
 
   
   (   )(    
   




(   )[       (       )]
                                               (14) 
 
We also assume        (       )    v 




TABLE 2. The Result of Comparative Statistics 
  h w b 
t - - ± 
m ± - ± 
y + + ± 
k ± - ± 
ρ ± - ± 
μ ± - ± 
a - 0 + 
τ + 0 - 
    + 0 - 
    + 0 - 
    - 0 + 
 
The effect of   ,   ,    on employment h indicates the normal results for a 
demand constrained economy.The increase of the investment demand, the increase 
in    and    and the consumption demand, and the decrease in the   increases the 
production.  
The variables b and h move in opposite directions.The model distinctively 
indicates that a worsening employment situation strengthens the political demand 
for more hospitable unemployment compensation.  
The implications are different, although the qualitative results of t, a,τ, and y in 
h are the same. 
First, we look at strengthening the tax for capital, an increase of t.In Bowles 
(2012) the increase of t and the decrease ofτ, decrease the wage rate $w$ because 
of the capital flight.Thus, both the labor supply and employment decrease.In 
contrast, in our model, the decrease of wage $w$ decreases the consumption 
demand.This results in the decrease of employment h. 
Next, we address the increase of the marginal disutility a and the decrease of the 
regulation of firing, a decrease ofτ.In Bowles (2012), the increase in disutility and 
the decrease in regulation for firing decrease employment because of the decrease 
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in the labor supply.In our model, the unemployment compensation decreases 
because the decrease in the employment makes the goods market excess 
supply.Therefore, the decrease in the effective demand from the decrease in 
government spending decreases employment h.  
The improvement of labor productivity y increases the real wage rate w due to 
the attraction of foreign capital.It results in an increase of employment due to the 
increase of the labor supply.In contrast, in our model, the employment increases 
because the increase in the demand is more than the increase in the supply. 
Next, we take a look at the increase of m.In Bowles (2012), it results in the 
decrease of the real wage rate w.Thus the employment h decreases due to the 
decrease in the labor supply.Conversely, in our model, the effect of the increase in 
m is ambiguous because it decreases both demand and supply. 
The increase in m decreases h when an autonomous demand like animal spirits 
is small. 
In Bowles (2012), the increase in k, ρ, andμ decrease the labor supply based 
on the decrease in the real wage rate from the capital flight. 
However, in our model, the effect on employment is ambiguous because it 
affects both demand and supply. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We introduce the demand factor to the Bowles (2012) model that showed the 
effectiveness of the redistribution policy under globalization and examine the 
Bowles argument (2012).The improvement of productivity and the decrease in the 
ratio of the monitoring labor through asset-based redistribution increase the real 
wage rate due to its lure for foreign capital. 
At this point, in the Bowles model, the labor supply increases and then 
employment increases. In contrast, in our model, the improvement of productivity 
increases employment, but the decrease in the monitoring labor does not always 
increase employment because both demand and supply increase.This means that 
asset-based redistribution under globalization is not always effective. 
However, our research is preliminary.We have to consider productivity 
improving policies of government spending and the endogenous risk premiums as 
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Substitute (18) for (10), we get 
 
          (   )                                                    (19) 
 
Next, substitute (8) and (18) for (11), we get 
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Using (3) and (8), we get 
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Thus, from(12) and (21), we get 
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In (14) when we assume 0<h<1,  (   ) (    
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i Shimano (2015) supports the assumption empirically. 
ii The social welfare is a type of reservation wage because many unemployed workers receive it. 
iii Please refer to Appendix 1 for the stability condition. 
iv Please refer to Appendix 2 for the calculation. 
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v There are some controversies on the Keynesian stability condition. Refer to Abe (2014, 2013), Hein, 
Lavoie, and van Treeck (2011), Skott (2012), and Skott and Zipperer (2012). 
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